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 2 
Abstract 3 
 4 
Intentional food crime is plural in nature in terms of the types of crime and the differing levels 5 
of financial gain. Successful models of food crime are dependent on how well the crime has 6 
been executed and at what point, or even if, detection actually occurs. The aim of this paper is 7 
to undertake a literature review and critique the often contradictory definitions that can be 8 
found in the literature in order to compare and contrast existing food crime risk assessment 9 
(FCRA) tools and their application. Food safety, food defense, and food fraud risk 10 
assessments consider different criteria in order to determine the degree of situational risk for 11 
each criteria and the measures that need to be implemented to mitigate that risk. Further 12 
research is required to support the development of global countermeasures that are of value in 13 
reducing overall risk even when the potential hazards may be largely unknown and specific 14 
countermeasures that can act against unique risks. 15 
Keywords: adulteration; fraud; holistic; risk mitigation 16 
Abbreviations: economically motivated adulteration (EMA); Food Crime Risk Assessment 17 
Model (FCRA) 18 
1. Introduction 19 
Contamination in the context of food can be described as “the introduction or occurrence of 20 
an unwanted organism, taint or substance to packaging, food, or the food environment” 21 
(BRC, 2015). Food safety hazards have been defined as “a biological, chemical, or physical 22 
agent in, or condition of, food with the potential to cause an adverse health effect” (CAC, 23 
2003; BS EN ISO 22000; 2005; Wallace et al. 2011). The United States (US) Federal Food, 24 
Drug and Cosmetic Act Section 342 defines adulterated food principally as food that bears or 25 
contains: “any poisonous or deleterious substance which may render it injurious to health; 26 
but in case the substance is not an added substance such food shall not be considered 27 
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adulterated under this clause if the quantity of such substance in such food does not 28 
ordinarily render it injurious to health.” Thus an adulterant can be deemed to be any 29 
poisonous or deleterious substance. Section 343 of the same legislation defines misbranded 30 
food as food that is falsely or misleadingly labeled, offered for sale under another name, is an 31 
imitation of another food, where a container is misleading as to the contents.  The term 32 
adulterated food as described above does not distinguish explicitly between intentional or 33 
unintentional addition of an adulterant. Lipp (2011) stated that to differentiate between the 34 
terms contamination and adulteration, and by inference contaminant and adulterant, the 35 
former should be considered in terms of unintentional activity and being technically 36 
unavoidable, whilst adulteration is intentional replacement of an ingredient that is specifically 37 
motivated e.g. for economic or ideological gain. 38 
It should be considered that although the terms contamination and malicious contamination 39 
have been used widely in the literature, some US literature distinguishes between 40 
contamination and adulteration in that the former is used to describe instances of 41 
unintentional contamination whilst the latter term is used to define all intentional activities 42 
whether motivated for economic gain (EMA) or not. In this paper if literature is quoted that 43 
has described an event as contamination, whereas the US definition would define it as 44 
adulteration, for purposes of accuracy to the original source that term has remained in the text. 45 
However, consideration should be given going forward when developing supply chain 46 
standards and regulations to ensure common terminology use as this would be of value. 47 
Whilst historically food safety was described as the concept that food will not cause harm to 48 
the consumer when it is prepared and/or eaten according to its intended use (BS EN ISO 49 
22000, 2005) i.e. a term encompassing both (a) intentional acts and (b) unintentional 50 
contamination, more recent literature seeks to differentiate between the two. PAS 96 (2014) 51 
defines a hazard as something that can cause loss or harm which arises from a naturally 52 
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occurring or accidental event or results from incompetence or ignorance of the people 53 
involved compared to a threat being something that can cause loss or harm which arises from 54 
the ill-intent of people.  FSIS (2014) characterizes food safety and food defense as being 55 
distinct issues that need to be addressed namely that food safety refers to protecting the food 56 
supply from unintentional contamination whereas food defense refers to protecting the food 57 
supply from intentional adulteration with a motive to cause harm. Alternatively the Global 58 
Food Safety Initiative (GFSI, 2013) suggests that food defense is a sub-set of food safety 59 
issues (where the adulterant has the potential to cause harm and separate where the agent is 60 
non-harmful rather than the FSIS definition of them being a separate set of issues.  61 
The potential for food crime is often influenced by a difference between availability and 62 
demand creating an opportunity for criminals or fraudsters to financially benefit from the 63 
shortfall. The World Food Summit of 1996 defined food security as existing “when all people 64 
at all times have access to sufficient, safe, nutritious food to maintain a healthy and active 65 
life” (WHO, nd). Defra (2006) goes further and defines levels of food security as: individual 66 
or household food security relating to purchasing power which is determined by income, 67 
access to resources, and affordability of food; regional food security where regions are 68 
dependent on key distribution routes for food; national/trading block food security relates 69 
to the ability of a country or trading block to assess sufficient foodstuffs, even in the face of 70 
severe disruptions to the supply chain; and global food security i.e. the ability of the world’s 71 
food producers to meet global demand, and ensure the efficiency and effectiveness of global 72 
trading and distribution systems. The interconnecting factors that frame food security also 73 
influence the opportunities for food crime. 74 
Crime is defined as an offence or illegal acts punishable by law. The term “illegal” can be 75 
considered as being unlawful, contrary to law or an activity which the law directly forbids 76 
(Rapalje and Lawrence, 1997). Food crime can be described as an activity organized by 77 
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individuals or groups who knowingly set out to deceive, and or injure, those purchasing and 78 
consuming food (adapted from Elliott Review, 2014).  This rationale would suggest that food 79 
crime occurs when food is intentionally modified in order to bring harm to individuals or for 80 
purposes of economic gain and both situations may lead to issues of food safety or food 81 
quality.  Two brothers who owned and operated Jensen Farms in Colorado pled guilty to 82 
charges associated with the introduction of cantaloupe adulterated with Listeria 83 
monocytogenes rendering the product injurious to health into interstate commerce (FDA, 84 
2013).  Thus it was determined that the cantaloupe bore a poisonous substance that rendered 85 
them injurious to health. In May of 2011 the Jensen brothers allegedly changed their 86 
cantaloupe cleaning system. The new system, built to clean potatoes, was installed, and was 87 
to include a catch pan to which a chlorine spray could be included to clean the fruit of 88 
bacteria. The chlorine spray, however, was never used. In this example the term adulteration 89 
is suggests that by intentionally failing to implement a process that is specifically designed to 90 
minimize the risk of  harm to consumers then a criminal act has taken place. 91 
Fraud can simply be described as: a type of criminal activity that can be an abuse of position, 92 
or false representation, or prejudicing someone’s rights for personal gain (SFO, nd). Food 93 
fraud is defined by the Food Standards Agency (FSA) as: “deliberately placing food on the 94 
market, for financial gain, with the intention of deceiving the consumer” (Elliott Review, 95 
2014). The Elliott Review (2014:6) states that “food fraud becomes food crime when it no 96 
longer involves random acts by ‘rogues’ within the food industry but becomes an organised 97 
activity by groups which knowingly set out to deceive, and or injure, those purchasing food” 98 
thus building on the FSA definition.  99 
The US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) determine economically motivated 100 
adulteration (EMA) as “the fraudulent, intentional substitution or addition of a substance in a 101 
product for the purpose of increasing the apparent value of the product or reducing the cost 102 
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of its production”, i.e., for economic gain (Lutter, 2009). EMA is therefore only one example 103 
of the types of fraudulent activity that can occur in the food supply chain and EMA as a 104 
definition should not be used when considering other types of fraudulent activity.  This is 105 
discussed more fully later in the paper. The aim of this research is to undertake a literature 106 
review and critique the often contradictory definitions that can be found in the literature in 107 
order to compare and contrast existing food crime risk assessment (FCRA) tools and their use. 108 
The use of the term FCRA is novel and not currently used in the literature and as such is an 109 
evolving concept. Whilst Elliott (2014) proposed the use of food crime prevention networks 110 
FCRA build on this as they contain two distinct elements as is described in this paper. Firstly 111 
there is the risk assessment process itself and then the development of a series of 112 
countermeasures that are embedded in a food control system at organizational or national 113 
levels. Thus adopting Felson’s approach (2006) of identifying events, sequences and settings 114 
is helpful in developing food crime risk assessment models.   115 
The methodological approach that has been used in terms of critiquing existing academic and 116 
gray literature is of value to academics and practitioners to clarify the current contradictions 117 
in the literature and to develop a common, accepted vocabulary that is then utilized going 118 
forward in the food industry. This element of redefinition will also inform future reviews of 119 
regulatory standards and also global standards such as those developed through Codex 120 
Alimentarius and the International Standards Organization (ISO). 121 
2. Food defense 122 
Food defense is the collective term used to describe activities associated with protecting the 123 
nation's food supply from deliberate or intentional acts of contamination or tampering (FDA, 124 
2014). Food defense therefore encompasses intentional contamination (perhaps better phrased 125 
as adulteration) of the food supply contrasting with the unintentional contamination that is the 126 
focus of established food safety measures (Mitenius et al. 2014). The authors suggest that the 127 
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concept of intentional adulteration as being separate from unintentional contamination 128 
introduces the notion of a different set of vocabulary such as perpetrator, malicious intent and 129 
capabilities.  Further, food defense has been described as the process to ensure the security of 130 
food and drink and their supply chains from all forms of intentional malicious attack 131 
including ideologically motivated attack leading to contamination or supply failure (GFSI, 132 
2013). This definition suggests that the term food defense is not only used to define national 133 
strategy towards intentional food adulteration, but also can be used at the supply chain and 134 
organizational level. Indeed BRC (2015) considers food defense as the procedures adopted to 135 
assure the safety of raw materials and products from malicious contamination or theft.  136 
Therefore, food defense has been said to reflect the protection activities, and/or the security 137 
assurance process or procedures that deliver product safety with regard to intentional acts of 138 
adulteration. These policies, processes and procedures will be defined in this paper as 139 
countermeasures (see Section 3). Countermeasures are the means and mechanisms 140 
implemented to mitigate risk and as a phrase widely used in criminology literature.  141 
Food defense strategies can therefore be implemented at national and local levels. The FDA 142 
(2015) has differentiated between national risk assessment models and supply chain or 143 
organizational food defense models. At national strategy level, in the US the CARVER+ 144 
Shock method has been adopted where the acronym CARVER stands for: Criticality – a 145 
measure of the public health and economic impacts of an attack as a result of the batch size or 146 
network of distribution; Accessibility – the ability to gain physically access and egress where 147 
this can change over time and also as a result of the use of counter-measures; Recuperability 148 
– the ability of food system to recover from an attack; Vulnerability – the ease of 149 
accomplishing the attack. This too can change over time and as a result of the use of counter-150 
measures; Effect – the amount of direct loss from an attack as measured by loss in 151 
production; Recognizability – the ease of identifying the target, with Shock a combined 152 
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measure of the health, psychological, and collateral national economic impacts of a 153 
successful attack on the target system being the final element (FDA, nd).  154 
A vulnerability assessment (VA) tool can be developed to operate at the food facility or 155 
individual food process level. The VA tool specifically focuses on three elements that reflect 156 
the vulnerabilities that exist and the means for their mitigation for an organization that could 157 
potentially be under threat namely the attributes: Criticality, Accessibility, and 158 
Vulnerability.  This approach is sometimes referred to as Vulnerability Analysis Critical 159 
Control Point or VACCP. The FDA and the US Department of Agriculture (USDA) adapted 160 
CARVER+ Shock to also develop a vulnerability assessment software (VAS) tool that can be 161 
used at food facility or process level in order to build a food defense plan (FDA, 2015). The 162 
food defense plan approach supports food business operators to develop personalized food 163 
defense plans by integrating existing FDA tools, guidance, and resources into one single 164 
application (FDA, 2015). Therefore a situational and premises focused food defense plan can 165 
be established to address the risk of intentional food adulteration. 166 
Situational risk has been explored within criminology literature (McGloin et al. 2011; Perline 167 
and Goldschmidt 2004). Situational risk factors, are often predictive,  lie outside of the 168 
individual and include environmental factors such as corporate culture, work environment and 169 
can have a multiple compounding impact (Perlite and Goldschmidt, 2004: Carson and Bull, 170 
2003)  and such risk can be reduced by strengthening environmental resilience to mitigate 171 
such risk (Clapton, 2014). Therefore, situational crime prevention seeks to reduce 172 
opportunities for specific categories of crime by increasing the associated risks and 173 
difficulties and reducing the rewards (Clarke, 1995) so situational crime prevention in terms 174 
of deterrence of food crime and reduction of crime risk is an important consideration (Spink 175 
and Moyer, 2011).  176 
Page 10 of 32
ScholarOne, 375 Greenbrier Drive, Charlottesville, VA, 22901
Journal of Food Science
For Peer Review
 8 
Crime vulnerability can be defined as the extent to which an individual, organization, supply 177 
chain or national food system is at risk from, or susceptible to, attack, emotional injury or 178 
physical harm or damage from an intentional act. The WHO (2002) suggested that 179 
vulnerability should be assessed on the basis of the scientific, economic, political and social 180 
circumstances of a country to measure the extent of the threat and to set priorities for 181 
resources. The WHO further note that vulnerability should be assessed as a multidisciplinary 182 
activity, with input from legal, intelligence, medical, scientific, economic and political sectors 183 
(Manning et al. 2005). On a national level vulnerability may be assessed on the basis of a 184 
number of factors (Table 1). Further, the determined level of vulnerability needs to be 185 
routinely reassessed to ensure that the ranking and prioritization of risk remains appropriate 186 
and that suitable countermeasure(s) continue to be in place.  187 
Take in Table 1 188 
 189 
Independently PAS 96 (2014) has been developed as a standard to underpin the Threat 190 
Analysis Critical Control Point (TACCP) approach to assessing the risk associated with such 191 
threats. PAS 96 (2014) describes TACCP as the systematic management of risk through the 192 
evaluation of threats, identification of vulnerabilities, and implementation of controls to 193 
materials and products, purchasing, processes, premises, distribution networks and business 194 
systems by a knowledgeable and trusted team with the authority to implement changes to 195 
procedures. TACCP has been designed to interface with and build upon food safety risk 196 
management methodology such as hazard analysis critical control point (HACCP) as many 197 
precautions taken to assure the safety of food, are likely to also deter or detect deliberate acts 198 
of contamination (PAS 96, 2014). TACCP uses a matrix type approach to identify the 199 
likelihood of an incident occurring and how it might be mitigated through the use of 200 
appropriate countermeasures. This approach is only of value where potential threats and the 201 
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risk associated with them can be assessed so it is of little value in mitigating against emerging 202 
issues when as previously outlined the modus operandi is for the crime to continue 203 
undetected. 204 
3. Food fraud and wider food crime 205 
Most food fraud cases are not harmful, but notable exceptions include the melamine in 206 
Chinese skimmed milk powder (Gossner et al. 2009), sudan dyes in spices (Stiborova et al. 207 
2002), false labeling of puffer fish as monkfish (Cohen et al. 2009) and the plasticizer di (2-208 
ethylhexyl) phthalate (DEHP) being used as a cheaper substitute of clouding agents in food 209 
and beverages (Yang et al. 2013). Different types of food fraud generate various levels of 210 
monetary gains, dependent on how well the ‘fraud’ has been carried out, and if detection 211 
occurs and form an element of wider food crime.  Spink and Moyer (2011) proposed seven 212 
types of food fraud: namely adulteration, counterfeit product, diversion of products outside of 213 
intended markets, over-run, simulation, tampering and theft (Table 2).  214 
Take in Table 2 215 
 216 
Criminal attributes can also be characterized into ideological, occasional, occupational, 217 
professional and recreational types (Spink et al. 2013). PAS 96 (2014) using a different 218 
approach identifies a number of threats that need to be considered when undertaking TACCP 219 
namely: EMA, malicious contamination, extortion, espionage, counterfeiting and cybercrime 220 
with an associated typology for individuals that pose a threat:  221 
• The extortionist. 222 
• The opportunist. 223 
• The extremist. 224 
• The irrational individual. 225 
• The disgruntled individual. 226 
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• The hacktivist and other cyber criminals. 227 
• The professional criminal. 228 
This extends beyond the product-orientated types of food fraud to consider wider 229 
organizational fraud associated with accounting, organizational “secrets” e.g. recipes, unique 230 
processing standards etc. When seeking to mitigate supply chain fraud assessment activities 231 
must consider countermeasures that are implemented at the supply chain level not just at the 232 
facility level. This parallels with the procurement requirement for the adoption of pre-233 
requisite programs such as good agricultural practice by suppliers that are designed to prevent 234 
food safety issues from occurring in the first place rather than focusing on activities within a 235 
site-HACCP plan for detection at facility level as the predominant level of control. 236 
Criminology and understanding of behavioral science provides a wider insight into the 237 
motivation and causation behind food crime. This research has considered the extent to which 238 
food fraud and food defense fit into these theoretical criminological frameworks (Table 3). 239 
Table 3 considers six crime motivation theories and shows the difference between traditional 240 
HACCP style risk assessment and the type of assessment that needs to be included in 241 
approaches such as TACCP and VACCP. Using HACCP whilst the cause of a food safety 242 
hazard is considered in terms how the hazard can arise in order to implement an appropriate 243 
preventive measure the mindset of the perpetrator or the incentives to intentionally 244 
contaminate have not been explicitly addressed. Furthermore if there is an argument that food 245 
safety, food fraud and food defense need to be risk assessed separately there is no requirement 246 
to include intentional food adulteration during the HACCP process. Food defense needs to 247 
consider the perpetrator, the relevance of impact and their motivation to cause harm. Food 248 
fraud is driven by singular motivation i.e. the desire for gain and in order to implement 249 
appropriate countermeasures the motivational element of food fraud needs to be fully 250 
understood.  251 
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Take in Table 3 252 
  253 
The magnitude of harm caused by intentional adulteration in terms of likelihood and severity 254 
will increase according not only to the agent used, but also if an individual can operate 255 
unnoticed in an organization or operates in collaboration with the organization. The degree of 256 
mitigation achieved by implementing appropriate countermeasures will vary by type of crime 257 
and by the commitment of the management of the organization to minimize vulnerability to 258 
crime (Table 4). Seven types of criminal are outlined in Table 4 from the ideologically 259 
motivated individual to those who see crime as a recreational activity for entertainment and 260 
amusement, occasional criminals that are opportunist and commit crime infrequently, 261 
occupational criminals who are active within their place of employment and professional 262 
criminals who fund their lifestyle completely from criminal activity. The magnitude of risk 263 
(in terms of likelihood and severity) is considered in Table 4 and will be unique to the 264 
situation that arises. Typical countermeasures have been described for different types of 265 
criminal that need to be considered within an effective food control program.  266 
This complexity is shown further in Table 5, and by using a slight modification of the 267 
questioning (5 Whys see Motarjemi and Wallace, 2014) technique of root causes analysis 268 
firstly food fraud and then food defense with regard to both internal employees and external 269 
agents and the risk of intentional food adulteration is considered. The root cause analysis 270 
demonstrates that a proactive approach to improving work and supply chain related practices 271 
and that focus on intentional adulteration i.e. countermeasures and the utilization of FCRA 272 
tools to determine vulnerability is essential in order to mitigate risk.   273 
Take in Tables 4 and 5 274 
 275 
Page 14 of 32
ScholarOne, 375 Greenbrier Drive, Charlottesville, VA, 22901
Journal of Food Science
For Peer Review
 12
This argument extends as shown in Tables 4 and 5 to the development of measures to mitigate 276 
risk developed as a result of using threat or vulnerability analysis tools. Mitigation measures 277 
or countermeasures are designed not only to lessen the impact, but also to make intentional 278 
contamination less likely in the first place (Mitenius et al. 2014). Countermeasures developed 279 
to minimize food crime risk can include: the use of unique serial numbers at batch, product or 280 
lot level; traceability through measures such as Radio Frequency Identification Devices 281 
(RFID), and features on the packaging of individual items such as special inks, holograms, 282 
etc. on cases of product or on each pallet (Spink et al. 2010). HACCP as a risk assessment 283 
tool was developed initially to consider contamination in its entirety both intentional and 284 
unintentional a differentiation between the terms food safety and food defense would mean 285 
that this may have to be revisited especially in light of an organization using a combination of 286 
HACCP, VACCP and TACCP as risk assessment tools. A HACCP approach considers the 287 
development of an operational pre-requisite program (OPRP). An OPRP is identified within 288 
hazard analysis approaches as essential in order to control the likelihood of introducing food 289 
safety hazards and/or the contamination or proliferation of food safety hazards in the 290 
product(s) or in the processing environment (BS EN ISO 22000: 2005). Further the 291 
development of an OPRP alongside the integration within an organizational management 292 
systems of an effective portfolio of food crime countermeasures is of great importance when 293 
considering the degree of risk associated with both adulteration and unintentional 294 
contamination in a given operational situation.  295 
The Global Food Safety Initiative (GFSI) position paper on mitigating the public health risk 296 
of food fraud (July 2014) considers the interaction of food defense, food fraud, food safety 297 
and food quality. This approach does not clearly separate food safety, food quality, food 298 
defense and food fraud but this may simply be a causal result of using a Venn diagram to 299 
pictorially describe the interaction. This overlapping representation is in contrast to FSIS 300 
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(2014) and the FAO Assuring Food Safety and Quality: Guidelines for Strengthening 301 
National Food Control Systems publication (2003:3) that states that: 302 
“Food safety refers to all those hazards, whether chronic or acute, that may make food 303 
injurious to the health of the consumer. It is not negotiable. Quality includes all other 304 
attributes that influence a product’s value to the consumer”. 305 
The FAO (2003) publication places particular importance on the fact that the clear distinction 306 
between food safety and food quality and this has public policy implications and also 307 
implications for the development of organizational management systems. Thus this separating 308 
of terminology can be extended to the organizational development of food safety, food 309 
defense and food quality plans, and determining their purpose in terms of what factors they 310 
are seeking to control. Therefore the four elements of a food control system, otherwise 311 
determined as the four elements of food protection (see Spink and Moyer, 2011) can be 312 
described as follows: 313 
• Food defense – ideologically motivated intentional adulteration that makes the food 314 
injurious to health. 315 
• Food fraud – economically motivated intentional adulteration that may or may not 316 
make the food injurious to health. Thus some food fraud issues may overlap with the 317 
definition of food defense whilst others may be a food quality issue. 318 
• Food safety – unintentional contamination of food that makes the food injurious to 319 
health; and 320 
• Food quality – delivery of attributes that influence a product’s value to consumers.   321 
These definitions have been drawn together visually (Figure 1). This approach differs from  322 
(i) that of Spink and Moyer (2011) where they identified the four elements described above, 323 
as being distinct i.e. no food fraud overlap between food quality and food safety (see Figure 324 
2) and (ii) that of GFSI (2014) where all four terms are seen as overlapping.   325 
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Take in Figures 1 and 2 326 
The rationale for determining the four elements food safety, food defense, food fraud and 327 
food quality as highlighted in this research is important when developing either a national or 328 
an organizational food control system.  329 
 330 
4. Approaches to developing independent food crime risk assessment (FCRA) 331 
Increasingly there is a requirement to consider a more holistic approach that encompasses not 332 
only scientific criteria, but also aspects of social science in order to risk assess adulteration.  333 
Six of the existing FCRA models have been compared (Table 6) in terms of their aims, 334 
mechanisms of operation and practicalities of use. Table 6 highlights the value of each model 335 
in different situations. The ability to actually quantify the likelihood of a threat or 336 
vulnerability in a given situation is in many ways influenced by the degree of adoption of 337 
countermeasures and their effectiveness.  338 
Take in Table 6 339 
The standard BS EN ISO 31000: 2009 – Risk management: principles and guidance provides 340 
principles, framework and a process for managing risk. The standard defines uncertainty (or 341 
lack of certainty) as a state or condition that involves a deficiency of information and leads to 342 
inadequate or incomplete knowledge or understanding. In the context of risk management, 343 
uncertainty exists whenever the knowledge or understanding of an event, consequence, or 344 
likelihood is inadequate or incomplete. Once determined, BS EN ISO 31000: 2009 provides a 345 
hierarchy of how risk should be dealt with: 346 
1. Avoiding the risk by deciding not to start or continue with the activity that gives rise 347 
to the risk; 348 
2. Accepting or increasing the risk in order to pursue an opportunity; 349 
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3. Removing the risk source; 350 
4. Changing the likelihood; 351 
5. Changing the consequences; 352 
6. Sharing the risk with another party or parties (including contracts and risk financing); 353 
and 354 
7. Retaining the risk by informed decision. 355 
HACCP too develops a hierarchy for assessing and mitigating food safety risk (CAC, 2003) 356 
the so called seven principles of HACCP: 357 
PRINCIPLE 1 Conduct a hazard analysis.  358 
PRINCIPLE 2 Determine the Critical Control Points (CCPs).  359 
PRINCIPLE 3 Establish critical limit(s).  360 
PRINCIPLE 4 Establish a system to monitor control of the CCP.  361 
PRINCIPLE 5 Establish the corrective action to be taken when monitoring indicates that a 362 
particular CCP is not under control.  363 
PRINCIPLE 6 Establish procedures for verification to confirm that the HACCP system is 364 
working effectively.  365 
PRINCIPLE 7 Establish documentation concerning all procedures and records appropriate to 366 
these principles and their application.  367 
In order to develop a food safety control system CCPs are identified using qualitative, semi-368 
quantitative or quantitative means of assessment. Matrices, scoring systems and decision trees 369 
are commonly used to identify specific CCPs and mechanisms to eliminate or reduce risk to 370 
an acceptable level. The degree of uncertainty is difficult to determine absolutely so semi-371 
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quantitative mechanisms are often used. This approach is also favored with TACCP to 372 
determine threats and vulnerabilities. The TACCP approach considers the following questions 373 
(PAS 96, 2014): 374 
1. Who might want to attack us?  375 
2. How might they do it?  376 
3. Where are we vulnerable?  377 
4. How can we stop them?  378 
The threat assessment uses a similar semi-quantitative matrix approach, but despite the name 379 
CCPs are not identified as TACCP is more of a threat prioritization system based on the 380 
presence or absence of appropriate countermeasures. The Carver+ Shock or CAV approach of 381 
VACCP again uses a semi-quantitative scoring approach through a scoring system without 382 
defining CCPs specifically. Marsh (2015) suggests that VACCP and TACCP must be 383 
undertaken simultaneously so an organization can have a clear picture of both threats and 384 
vulnerabilities. Instead of using CCPs, Marsh (2015) decided to use Vulnerability and Threat 385 
Points (VTP) as a mechanism for prioritizing risk. In another approach, the NSF Fraud 386 
Protection Model can be used to assist organizations to ‘think like a criminal’ – particularly in 387 
assessing vulnerability from the perspective of what is advantageous to the fraudster (NSF, 388 
2015). Hence, the model was based on the assumption that fraudsters tend to target food 389 
products of higher value where the adulteration is difficult to detect. This can be used to 390 
create a hierarchy of low medium and high food fraud risk scenarios (Figure 3).  391 
Take in Figure 3  392 
Six models have been analysed TACCP, VACCP, the food protection risk matrix (Spink and 393 
Moyer, 2011), the food fraud model (NSF, 2014), the USP Preventive Food Fraud 394 
Management System and the CARVER + Shock Tool (FDA, 2014). The mechanisms 395 
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employed are ones of semi-quantitative risk assessment using prioritization matrices or 396 
weighted scoring systems. This approach is often weakened by the degree of uncertainty as to 397 
the exact nature of the threat and its likelihood of occurrence. This means that “unknown” 398 
threats cannot be mitigated using this approach alone. The most important element of FCRA 399 
is the development of a holistic hierarchy (adapted from BS EN ISO 31000: 2009) of how 400 
risk should be mitigated: 401 
1. Avoiding the risk by ceasing activity or removing the source (only of value with risks 402 
that can be quantified); 403 
2. Avoiding the risk by not commencing the activity (only of value with risks that can be 404 
quantified); 405 
3. Reducing the risk by implementing countermeasures to reduce the likelihood of 406 
occurrence (this approach can address both known and unknown threats where they 407 
are controlled by the same countermeasure); 408 
4. Sharing the risk with another party or parties including contracts, insurance and risk 409 
financing - again this of limited value if a threat and its potential impact cannot be 410 
quantified; and 411 
5. Retaining the risk or accepting the level of risk by informed management decision 412 
with the associated monitoring and verification activities. 413 
In many cases there is a requirement at national or organizational level for informed decision 414 
making with regard to degree of risk that is also centered on the balance between cost and 415 
benefit derived which is often difficult to determine in the case of unknown or un-quantified 416 
threat. 417 
5. Conclusion 418 
The aim of this research is to undertake a literature review and critique the definitions that can 419 
be found in the literature in order to compare and contrast existing FCRA models and their 420 
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application. Figure 1 has been developed to demonstrate the clear distinction between food 421 
safety, food quality and food defense and the overlapping nature of food fraud incidents 422 
depending on whether the intentional criminal activity has the potential to cause harm or 423 
impact on product quality. This builds on existing literature by clearly differentiating what is 424 
and is not included in terms of threat, or as in food safety defined as a food safety hazard, i.e. 425 
the cause and then how the effect before and after countermeasures have been implemented is 426 
quantified when undertaking a VACCP, TACCP or HACCP assessment. The challenge is that 427 
the distinction between a potential threat (hazard) and the consequences (effect) should it 428 
arise, and the difference between adulteration and unintentional contamination of food and 429 
thus the associated countermeasures that should be adopted, is not always fully appreciated by 430 
individuals at the facility level who are involved in developing an overarching food 431 
protection/control system. This is an organizational weakness that can then lead to the 432 
implementation of an adequate food protection/control system which is of little value to the 433 
organization in mitigating threat. Intentional food crime is plural in nature in terms of the 434 
types of crime and the differing levels of financial gain. This can also be said in terms of the 435 
multiplicity of definitions of food safety, food defense, food fraud and food quality found in 436 
both academic and gray literature. This plurality creates confusion and multiple 437 
interpretations when FCRA is adopted and implemented. In further iterations of regulations, 438 
standards and industry protocols increasing harmonization will benefit the industry in 439 
developing cohesive food protection/control programs that address all four elements described 440 
in this paper and clearly differentiate between contamination and adulteration. Successful 441 
modes of food crime are dependent on how well the crime has been carried out and at what 442 
point, or even if, detection actually occurs. BS EN ISO 31000: 2009 provides a hierarchy of 443 
how risk should be dealt with including avoiding, accepting or retaining risk. Appropriate 444 
countermeasures should be adopted as a result of the use of an FCRA model and reassessment 445 
Page 21 of 32
ScholarOne, 375 Greenbrier Drive, Charlottesville, VA, 22901
Journal of Food Science
For Peer Review
 19
to either remove the risk source; change the likelihood of the risk or the consequences should 446 
it occur, sharing or spreading the risk or retaining but monitoring the risk on an ongoing basis. 447 
Further research is therefore required to support the development of global countermeasures 448 
over and above the critique in Table 4. A framework of countermeasures that are developed in 449 
consort with FCRA activities is of value to any organization as has been demonstrated with 450 
the development of OPRP to address potential hazards and mitigate food safety risk at facility 451 
and supply chain levels. 452 
 453 
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 630 
Table 1. Factors that can be used to assess national food system vulnerability (Source: 631 
Manning et al. 2005) 632 
 633 
Factors that can be used to assess national food system vulnerability 
• The effectiveness of the countries food safety management infrastructure and current 
surveillance mechanisms; 
• Availability of potential food contamination agents; 
• Motivation for perpetrators of food terrorism; 
• Potential for the agent to contaminate mass produced food and gain widespread distribution; 
• Potential of human-to-human transmission of the agent; 
• Capability for an effective emergency response and; 
• Potential size of the threat to the food supply chain, animal health and welfare, export food 
trade, tourism and public health. 
 634 
Table 2. Types of food crime (Adapted from BRC, 20151; Spink and Moyer, 20132 and 635 
Croall, 20093) 636 
Type2 Definition1 Definition2 Definition3 
Adulteration The addition of an 
undeclared material 
into a food item for 
economic gain. 
A component of the finished 
product is fraudulent 
Product adulteration 
Counterfeit  All aspects of the fraudulent 
product and packaging are fully 
replicated 
 
Diversion  The sale or distribution of 
legitimate products outside of 
intended markets 
 
Over-run  Legitimate product is made in 
excess of production agreements 
 
Simulation  Illegitimate product is designed to 
look like but does not exactly 
copy the legitimate product 
 
Tampering  Legitimate product and packaging 
are used in a fraudulent way 
 
Theft  Legitimate product is stolen and 
passed off as legitimately 
procured 
 
Malicious 
poisoning, 
bioterrorism or  
sabotage 
 Intentional adulteration with a 
view to cause harm, fear or dread 
using other types of food crime 
identified by Spink and Moyer 
(2013). 
Food poisoning 
Misleading 
indications 
(words/ 
pictures)2 
  Use of words such as “natural”, 
“traditional”. Use of pictures e.g. 
depictions on packaging that do 
not reflect the nature of the 
product inside or the methods of 
production 
Packaging 
size2 
  Use of overlarge packaging 
 637 
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Table 3. Motivation behind food fraud and food defense activities  
Types of 
food crime 
Rational Choice 
Theory (Pease, 2006) 
Routine Activity 
Approach (Cohen 
and Felson, 1979) 
Social Control Theory (Hirschi, 1969) Relative 
Deprivation 
(Walklate, 
2007) 
Game-theoretic approach 
(Hirschauer and Zwoll 
2008) 
Common sense 
(Walklate 2007) 
Food fraud Perpetrator weighs the 
costs and benefits of 
committing a crime and 
makes his or her choice. 
In this context, choice is 
governed by time, 
ability and access to 
relevant information.  
Economic incentive as 
pull factor 
Offenders decided 
to commit crime 
according to a 
particular time, 
targeted victims and 
place. Categorized 
into a triangular 
relation – a 
motivated offender, 
potential victim and 
the presence or 
absence of a 
guardian. It is 
important in this 
scenario for the 
offender to be 
aware of the 
victim’s routine 
Bound by fear of consequences. Social 
controls exerted by four types of bonds. 
Attachment level of strength or weakness 
of relationships between an individual 
and others as via relationships. The 
stronger the social expectation, the 
stronger the attachment, the more likely 
the individual will conform. Commitment 
i.e. conformity to a particular lifestyle. 
The higher the level of commitment, the 
less likely the individual will deviate 
from it. Involvement - the time spent in 
conventional behavior or law abiding 
practices. The longer the time spent in 
engaging in these activities, the less time 
the individuals will have for other things. 
The final bond explains that if an 
individual had been brought up with the 
belief that they are law abiding citizens, 
the less likely they are to break the law. 
Occurs when an 
individual feels 
deprived or 
perceive 
themselves as 
deprived. The 
sense of 
deprivation is 
commonly (but 
not exclusively) 
connected to 
material 
circumstances 
Economics / 
incentives as 
pull factor 
Reconstructs the monetary 
incentives of profit-oriented 
actors. The likelihood for 
these economic actors to 
break rules increase with the 
probability of profits they 
expect to earn and reduces if 
losses are anticipated due to 
risk of detection. At the same 
time, fraud activities will 
decrease with an increase in 
social factors that could 
‘protect’ or ‘shield’ the profit-
oriented actors from yielding 
to the economic temptation.  
Estimates the incentives of 
actors in farm or food 
industries. Helps to identify 
or expose critical settings 
where economic temptations 
may arise. 
Food fraud is driven by 
monetary needs or gains 
and / or greed.   
Food defense Time, ability and 
information. Motivation 
to do harm. 
Motivated offender 
with a clear 
potential victim. 
No fear of consequences. Impact oriented. Impact oriented. Sadist, enjoy thrill of 
‘excitement’ caused by 
the harm, revenge, envy. 
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Table 4. Criminal types and attributes, risk and typical countermeasures (Adapted from Spink et al. 2013) 
 
Types of Criminals Definition Magnitude of risk 
(Likelihood/Severity) 
Typical countermeasures and controls in the food supply chain to 
mitigate risk 
Ideological poisoning- (usually 
single motive group or 
individual) 
Domestic or international terrorist who 
commits the criminal act to make an 
ideological statement or to economically 
harm an entity, or to create panic and fear 
in the target population. 
Magnitude will depend on the nature of 
the product, organization, supply chain 
and/or the population targeted.  
Currently the use of risk assessment by organizations to identify 
appropriate controls e.g. security, tamper evidence, supplier assurance 
Recreational tampering and or 
theft. 
Undertakes crime for entertainment or 
amusement 
Low risk potentially mitigated by 
implementing appropriate 
countermeasures. 
Traditional technical risk assessment to implement supply chain and onsite 
security e.g. enclosed containers, secure vehicles and containers, tamper 
evident seals etc. 
Occasional diversion, 
tampering or theft 
Infrequent, opportunistic individual Low risk potentially mitigated by 
implementing appropriate 
countermeasures. 
Traditional technical risk assessment to implement supply chain and onsite 
security e.g. enclosed containers, secure vehicles and containers, tamper 
evident seals etc. 
Occasional over-run Infrequent, opportunistic individual Low risk potentially mitigated by 
implementing appropriate 
countermeasures. 
Stock control measures and mass balance exercises to ensure that resources 
utilized equate to product sold legitimately on invoices, dispatch notes etc. 
Occasional adulteration 
(substitution) e.g. product with 
different provenance or method 
of production i.e. conventional 
product sold as organic, 
different ingredients etc. 
Infrequent, opportunistic individual Low risk potentially mitigated by 
implementing appropriate 
countermeasures. 
This activity would be reactive and not systemic within the organization or 
the food supply network. Controls will be different depending on whether 
perpetrators are inside or outside the business and whether there is internal 
pressure to substitute to meet supply chain requirements e.g. order size. 
Measures such as stock control, mass balance exercises, internal audits, 
CCTV cameras may identify but risk level increases especially if 
adulteration cannot be identified readily by laboratory or visual analysis. 
Occupational Crime occurs at the place of employment, 
either as an individual acting alone or in 
collaboration with the modus operandi of 
the organization 
Magnitude of risk increases especially 
if individual can operate unnoticed in 
an organization or operates in 
collaboration with the organization. 
Potentially a degree of mitigation by 
implementing appropriate 
countermeasures unless the activity is 
deliberately ignored or encouraged by 
management. 
Crime occurs at the place of employment, either lone individuals or 
through collaboration with the modus operandi of the organization. 
Perpetrators understand the controls and countermeasures in place and are 
able to work around them falsifying documentation if necessary 
Professional Criminal activity fully finances their 
lifestyle 
Magnitude of risk increases and will 
depend on the nature of the product, 
organization, supply chain and/or the 
population targeted. 
Existing measures and controls in place can be vulnerable to professional 
criminals and their networks 
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Table 5. Root cause analysis of intentional food adulteration (Adapted from Motarjemi and Wallace, 2014). 
 
 Food fraud Food Defense (internal employee) Food Defense (external agent) 
1 Why was the fraud committed? Why did the employee deliberately adulterate the 
product? 
Why did the agent deliberately adulterate the 
product? 
 Motivated for monetary gain. Deliberately modifying 
the food to achieve more $ 
Motivated to harm or insinuate harm had been caused. Motivated to harm, publicity, other motive 
2 Why did the agent want monetary gain? Why did the employee want to bring harm? Why did the agent want to bring harm? 
 Motivation to access money especially if perpetrator 
can identify a vulnerability 
Revenge, dissatisfaction,  excitement in causing chaos, 
financial gain e.g. blackmail,  
Revenge, dissatisfaction, envy (competitor), excitement 
in causing chaos, financial gain e.g. blackmail 
3 Why did the agent target this organization? Why did the employee feel dissatisfy or resentful? Why did the agent target this organization? 
 Ability to perpetrate the crime without discovery, 
magnitude of financial gain compared to risk. 
Unjust work-related practices, termination, personal grudge Unjust business-related practices, personal grudge, ability 
to gain publicity due to organization’s profile. 
4 Why did illicit business related practices arise? 
What is it about the organization’s profile that 
draws attention? 
Why was the employee terminated? Why did unjust 
work-related practices arise in the company? 
Why did unjust business-related practices arise with 
the company? What is it about the organization’s 
profile that draws attention? 
 In order to answer the above specific questions, the 
respective organization can investigate reasons e.g. 
vulnerability to fraud, networks in which the business 
operates etc. 
In order to answer the above specific questions, the 
respective organization can investigate if the above claims 
are true and find ways to resolve unjust work-related 
practices.  
In order to answer the above specific questions, the 
respective organization can investigate reasons e.g. 
country of origin of organization, religious or ideological 
background, previous business practice that could warrant 
organization being seen as unjust. 
5 How should the company react? How should the company react? How should the company react? 
 Investigate the incident and identify vulnerabilities 
through the use of an appropriate analysis tool 
Change of keys /access number to reduce accessibility, 
security and utilization of threat analysis tool  
Change of keys /access number to reduce accessibility, 
security and utilization of CARVER + Shock tool 
6 How proactive should the company be to reduce 
future risk of threats 
How proactive should the company be to reduce future 
internal food threats? 
How proactive should the company be to reduce 
future external food threats? 
 Adopt proactive approach to improve work related 
practices and conditions and utilization of appropriate 
analysis tool. 
Adopt proactive approach to improve work related practices 
and conditions and utilization of threat analysis tool. 
Adopt proactive approach to improve work and supply 
chain related practices and conditions and utilization of 
threat analysis tool. 
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Table 6. Comparison of existing FCRA models   
 Threat Assessment 
Critical Control Point 
(TACCP) 
Vulnerability 
Assessment and 
Critical Control 
Point (VACCP) 
Food Protection Risk Matrix 
(Spink and Moyer 2011) 
NSF Fraud 
Protection Model 
(NSF, 2014) 
USP Preventive Food 
Fraud Management 
System (USP, nd) 
CARVER + Shock Tool (US FDA) 
Aims To assess threats and  
prevent behaviorally or 
ideologically motivated 
intentional adulteration   
(Leathers 2014)  
To assess how 
exposed/ 
susceptible 
organization or 
premise is to food 
fraud incidents.  
Prevention of  
intentional EMA 
(Spink 2014) 
To differentiate food fraud 
among other food control 
elements such as food safety, 
food defense and food quality.  
To better anticipate 
the likelihood of 
fraudulent attack on 
food products 
especially according 
to product value. 
To assist users in how to 
develop and implement a 
preventive system 
specifically for the 
adulteration of food 
ingredients. 
Allows user to think like an attacker and to determine the most 
vulnerable point within a system or premise to an attack. 
To focus resources on protecting the most susceptible points in 
the system. 
Mechanisms Qualitative assessments 
(likelihood x impact) of 
threats 
Qualitative 
assessments 
(likelihood x 
impact) of threats 
Risk matrix is designed to 
identify the cause of risk and the 
motivations driving the fraud 
but not the effect. 
Built on a 4 quadrant 
Boston Consulting 
Group (BCG) 
matrix. 
-Top right = 
products most 
attractive to 
fraudster 
-Bottom left = least 
attractive to 
fraudster 
-Size of circle of a 
food product 
represents the 
perceived difficulty 
of conducting the 
fraud.   
Structured approach to 
characterize food fraud 
vulnerabilities with 
associated guidance to 
develop mitigation 
strategies. 
 
Nine contributing factors 
considered and how they 
impact on vulnerability 
using a matrix approach. 
 
Lifecycle approach 
proposed for food fraud 
management. 
Based on seven attributes which are scored on a scale of 1-10 
(FDA 2014) 
• Criticality - measure of public health and economic impacts 
of an attack 
• Accessibility – ability to physically access and egress from 
target 
• Recuperability – ability of system to recover from an attack 
• Vulnerability – ease of accomplishing attack 
• Effect – amount of direct loss from an attack as measured 
by loss in production 
• Recognizability – ease of identifying target 
• Shock – combined health, economic, and psychological 
impacts of an attack. 
Provides relative risk rankings for nodes / process steps in a 
production process or national food system. 
Practicalities Likelihood and impact 
scores and use of priority 
matrix in TACCP 
provides hierarchy for 
action by risk for 
organizations. 
Assess threats within 
manufacturing 
environment or within an 
organization but will be 
difficult to assess 
suppliers i.e. prior to 
delivery  (Marsh 2015) 
Can be used in the 
wider supply 
chain. 
The four quadrants in the matrix 
assist in exploring criteria 
Food quality – may be caused 
by mishandling 
Food safety – may be caused by 
unintentional contamination 
Food fraud – intentionally done 
to increase profit margin 
Food defense – deliberately 
carried out to cause harm (Spink 
and Moyer, 2011) 
Food industries and 
regulatory teams can 
use the model to 
anticipate which 
products are most 
likely to be targeted 
by fraudsters, the 
factors for targeting 
and whether 
previous frauds had 
occurred.  
Four step process. First 
three characterize fraud 
vulnerabilities associated 
with an ingredient by 
considering occurrence 
and impact. Last step is 
guidance. 
Critical or vulnerable nodes / process steps are identified based 
on the scores. 
Prioritize mitigation measures and resources to reduce 
likelihood of attack. 
 
Another option in CARVER + Shock would be to only use the 
Criticality, Accessibility and Vulnerability (CAV) scores and 
facility or process line level. 
Suggestions / 
Extensions  
To assess both threats and vulnerabilities and 
combined under one system. Combine threat 
and vulnerability assessment and manage risk 
under one management system. 
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Figure 1. Intentional and unintentional modifications of food (food fraud, defense, safety 
and quality) that need to be addressed in a food control system. (Adapted from GFSI, 
2014; FSIS, 2014; Leathers, 2014; Spink and Moyer, 2011) 
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Figure 2. The food protection risk matrix (Adapted from Spink and Moyer, 2011) 
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Figure 3. Food fraud quadrant model (Adapted from NSF, 2015) 
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